Compare the following arguments…
1) Veridical perception of an orange and a hallucination of an orange have something in common, call it a “seeming”. We should thus explain veridical perception in terms of such “seemings. (Also: we should explain knowledge of oranges in the same seeming-based way)
2) A real gun and a fake gun have something in common, call it “surface appearance”. We should thus explain real guns in terms of “surface appearance”.
“A non-existent physical object — such as Santa Claus or Pegasus — cannot be equated to an existent abstract or mental object. To emphasize the obvious, the former do not exist, ,whereas the latter do. And the former, were they real, would have mass, location, colour, smell, taste, etc., while the latter would not, indeed do not.” Discuss!
Pragmatic reductio: The position doesn’t actually entail a contradiction, but the argument for it “shows” that there is an absurdity lurking somewhere.
Exercise! Spot the many missteps in the following argument schema:
P1: States S1 and S2 seem the same in a situation I can imagine.
P2: In this situation I can imagine, S2 seems possible without external connections.
C: S1 does not in fact require external connections.
This is a joke. And a clever and telling one at that. Still, is it really true that the word ‘feminist’ has its meaning exhausted by person who believes that men and women have equal rights? The term certainly has connotations, both positive and negative, that extend beyond that. So, if connotations are part of “meaning”, then ‘feminist’ means more than this. The words aren’t synonymous in that very strong sense. But do ‘feminist’ and ‘person who believes that men and women have equal rights’ even have the same extension — i.e., are they true of all and only the same people? Some questions to ponder when making up your mind. Could someone believe that women and men have equal rights but hold that MAN and WOMAN are essentially and genetically different kinds, rather than mere social constructs? Would such a person be a feminist? Could someone believe that women and men have equal rights but insist that this doesn’t entail equality of outcome, only equality of opportunity — so that, say, affirmative action policies are impermissible? Again, if so, would that person be a feminist? Does being a feminist entail political activism? Does believing that women and men have equal rights do so to the same degree? More radically, is it logically consistent to say “I believe that men and women have equal rights, but I think abortion should be illegal” in the way it seems an oxymoron to be a “pro-life feminist”?
What are the connotations of calling someone your “partner”? What is the point of doing so? Here is Laci Green from Sex+ with a great little segment:
And should governments finance it? DISCUSS!
Students in “Talking Philosophy”, can one consistently endorse the firing of Shirvell for his Facebook posts, while decrying the firing of Salaita for his? How do the two cases differ?
PLM is a European network of centres, institutes and departments with a strong commitment to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind (see http://langmind.eu/). PLM organises conferences, master classes and internal workshops. PLM was formed in 2010 and now has the following members (representative on the PLM committee given in brackets):
- Arché, St Andrews (Herman Cappelen)
- Department of Philosophy, CEU, Budapest (Hanoch Ben-Yami)
- CLLAM, Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University (Peter Pagin)
- CSMN, Oslo (Robyn Carston)
- ILCLI, University of the Basque County, San Sebastian (Kepa Korta)
- ILLC, Amsterdam (Paul Dekker)
- Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris (François Recanati)
- Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr University Bochum (Markus Werning)
- Institute of Philosophy, University of London (Barry C. Smith)
- LanCog, University of Lisbon (João Branquinho)
- LOGOS, University of Barcelona (Marie Guillot)
Third PLM Conference
Every two years PLM organises a conference on the philosophy of language and philosophy mind. The third PLM conference will take place at the CSMN in Oslo, 11-13 September 2015.
Keynote Speakers are:
– Herman Cappelen (Arche, St.Andrews and CSMN, Oslo)
– Kathrin Glüer (Stockholm University)
– Chris Gauker (University of Salzburg)
– Michiel van Lambalgen (University of Amsterdam)
– Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris)
Call for Papers
The conference welcomes contributed papers in the areas of philosophy of language (widely construed, including philosophical logic) and philosophy of mind. Contributed papers will be allocated 40 minutes, including 10-15 minutes for discussion.
Submission of Abstracts
The organizers invite submissions of abstracts for presentation at the conference. Abstracts should be anonymous, not more than two pages of A4, and submitted as a .pdf file.
Please attach the abstract to an email in the body of which you specify the name of the corresponding author, her/his affiliation, and the title of the talk.
Submissions should be send to 3rdPLMconference@gmail.com
Deadline: Friday, 3rd April 2015.
Results of the selection will be communicated no later than Monday, 8th June 2015.
Possible Publication of Selected Papers:
Synthese has published a special issue with papers from the first conference (Volume 190, Issue 10, July 2013), and a Synthese special issue with papers from the second conference is forthcoming. A similar special issue of Synthese with papers from the third conference will be considered, to which a number of speakers (selected from both the keynote and submitted presentations) will be invited to contribute.